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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
 No. 13-1199 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JOHN GRZYMINSKI, 
                                 Appellant 
_______________________ 
 
 
On Appeal from the District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
D.C. Criminal No.  2-12-cr-00465-001 
(Honorable Stewart Dalzell) 
 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 12, 2013 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, SCIRICA, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges  
 
(Filed: November 14, 2013) 
 
 
_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 Defendant John Grzyminski pleaded guilty to possession of unregistered firearms 
in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d).  He appeals his sentence of 30 months imprisonment, 
3 years of supervised release, a fine of $500, and a special assessment of $100.  Because 
his sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable, we will affirm. 
I. 
 On May 9, 2012, Grzyminski’s mother, Catherine Wilson, returned to the house 
she shared with her son after a brief hospital stay.  Upon arriving, Wilson and her other 
son, Michael Grzyminski, discovered defendant had openly displayed numerous guns 
around the house.  Soon after, defendant got into an argument with Wilson and Michael, 
which prompted Wilson to call the Warrington Township police.  The police informed 
Wilson and Michael they could not remove the firearms because Grzyminski had a 
license to possess them. 
 After the police left, Wilson and Michael noticed a pipe bomb sitting on the 
kitchen counter with a butane lighter nearby.  Wilson called the police again.  In addition 
to the Warrington police, the Philadelphia Police Department Bomb Disposal Unit and 
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives responded to the scene.  After 
evacuating the neighborhood, the Bomb Disposal Unit searched the house and discovered 
two more pipe bombs in a spare bedroom upstairs.  Grzyminski left the scene during the 
Bomb Disposal Unit’s search, but the Solebury Township police arrested him without 
incident the next day. 
 On September 17, 2012, Grzyminski pleaded guilty to one count of possession of 
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unregistered firearms in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) for possession of the three pipe 
bombs.  At his plea hearing, defendant told the court he used pipe bombs for recreational 
purposes on July 4th and New Year’s Eve.1  Based on his offense level and criminal 
history category, the United States Probation Office in its Presentence Investigation 
Report calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 30 to 37 months imprisonment.
2
 
 At the sentencing hearing on January 4, 2013, Grzyminski requested a sentence of 
time served—at the time, 8 months.  He argued the Guidelines range was “excessive” 
because he did not intend to hurt anyone and did not have a criminal history.  (App. 20.)  
The Government contended a Guidelines sentence was appropriate based primarily on the 
circumstances of the offense—in particular, leaving a pipe bomb near a lighter, which 
required law enforcement to evacuate the neighborhood.  After hearing from the 
Government, defense counsel, and Grzyminski himself, the District Court sentenced him 
to 30 months imprisonment, 3 years of supervised release, a fine of $500, and a special 
assessment of $100.  This timely appeal followed.
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II. 
 Grzyminski contends the District Court’s Guidelines range sentence of 30 months 
imprisonment was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.  He argues the sentence 
                                              
 
1
 In an interview with the Warrington police after his arrest, defendant said he 
used pipe bombs to hunt bears and threw them into lakes for entertainment. 
 
 
2
 Grzyminski had an adjusted offense level of 19 and a criminal history category 
of I. 
 
 
3
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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was procedurally unreasonable because the court did not meaningfully consider his 
personal characteristics and the circumstances of the offense.  He contends the sentence 
was substantively unreasonable because the court did not reasonably apply the sentencing 
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
 As the party challenging the sentence, Grzyminski has the burden of showing 
unreasonableness.  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  
We review the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the District Court’s sentence 
for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Begin, 696 F.3d 405, 411 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing 
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). 
 Our review of a district court’s sentencing decision has two steps.  We first review 
the sentence for procedural error, which requires ensuring the district court “(1) correctly 
calculated the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range, (2) appropriately considered any 
motions for a departure under the Guidelines, and (3) gave meaningful consideration to 
the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”  Id. at 411 (citation omitted).  If 
the sentence is procedurally sound, we then review for substantive reasonableness.  Id.  
Under the highly deferential abuse of discretion standard, a sentence is substantively 
reasonable if “‘the record as a whole reflects rational and meaningful consideration of the 
factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).’” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568 (quoting United 
States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc)). 
 Turning first to the procedural reasonableness of Grzyminski’s sentence, he does 
not argue the District Court incorrectly calculated his Guidelines range or improperly 
considered any motions for a departure.  Accordingly, we only address his argument that 
5 
 
the court did not give meaningful consideration to the sentencing factors set forth in § 
3553(a), namely, his personal characteristics and the circumstances of the offense. 
 Here, the District Court considered these factors in great depth during the 
sentencing hearing.  The court raised defendant’s lack of criminal history and the severity 
of his offense in its initial interaction with defense counsel.  (See App. 20 (“This is quite 
a puzzling matter to me because, on the one hand, your client has no criminal record to 
speak of, but, on the other hand, when he decided to go over the line, he did it big 
time.”).)  The court and defense counsel then discussed this juxtaposition between the 
severity of the offense and defendant’s lack of criminal history for the next six pages of 
the sentencing transcript.  (Id. at 20–21.)  Finally, the court addressed these factors with 
Grzyminski himself before imposing its sentence.  (Id. at 22). 
 Although Grzyminski disagrees with the weight the court accorded his personal 
characteristics and the circumstances of the crime, the record shows the court 
meaningfully considered these factors in its sentencing decision.  Because the sentence 
was procedurally reasonable, we evaluate whether it was substantively reasonable. 
 The record reflects the District Court’s “‘rational and meaningful consideration of 
the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).’” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568 (quoting Grier, 
475 F.3d at 571).  The court took into account Grzyminski’s lack of criminal history, 
weighed this factor against other § 3553(a) factors, including the nature and 
circumstances of the crime and the need to protect the public by deterring similar 
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conduct, and concluded a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range was justified.
4
   
 Defendant argued his crime should be punished less severely because he intended 
to use the pipe bombs for recreational, not criminal, purposes.  Despite defendant’s 
characterization of his actions, the court was troubled by several aspects of the offense.  
The court highlighted that Grzyminski placed three pipe bombs in a home in a residential 
area and left one of the bombs near a butane lighter.  (App. 20, 22.)  In addition, the court 
noted his actions “horrified” his mother and “hugely affected” his neighbors, as they had 
to evacuate their homes while law enforcement searched defendant’s house and disabled 
the bombs.  (Id. at 22.)  The court also stressed the need to protect the public by deterring 
others from engaging in similar conduct.  (See id. (“[W]e absolutely have to protect the 
public from crimes like this and deter people, whether because [using pipe bombs is] 
amusing or people think it’s amusing.”).) 
                                              
 
4
 In an argument first raised on appeal, Grzyminski contends the current 
Guidelines range is substantively unreasonable because it is not based on empirical data 
or experience.  (Br. Appellant 17–18 (citing Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 
(2007)).)  While not entirely clear, his argument appears to be that the current Guidelines 
range is unreasonable because the firearm offense to which he pleaded guilty was 
punished less severely in the past.  (Id.)  Because defendant failed to raise this objection 
at sentencing, we review for plain error.  United States v. Couch, 291 F.3d 251, 252–53 
(3d Cir. 2002). 
 Defendant’s argument rests on an incorrect reading of Kimbrough.  As we 
explained in United States v. Lopez-Reyes, 589 F.3d 667 (3d Cir. 2009), “Kimbrough 
does not require a district court to reject a particular Guidelines range where that court 
does not, in fact, have disagreement with the Guideline at issue.”  Id. at 671 (emphasis 
added).  The District Court never, at any time during Grzyminski’s sentencing, voiced a 
policy disagreement with the sentencing Guideline applicable to a conviction for 
possession of an unregistered firearm.  Nor did the District Court commit plain error in 
failing to consider the historical development of the unregistered firearm sentencing 
Guideline.  See id. (noting that “a district court is not required to engage in ‘independent 
analysis’ of the empirical justifications and deliberative undertakings that led to a 
particular Guideline.”). 
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 Based on the § 3553(a) factors, the court found sentencing defendant at the bottom 
of the Guidelines range was “warranted.”  (Id. at 22.)  Because this 30-month sentence 
“falls within the broad range of possible sentences that can be considered reasonable in 
light of the § 3553(a) factors, we must affirm.”  United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 218 
(3d Cir. 2008). 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence. 
